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CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
George J. Dancigers*
A. William Charters**
I. INTRODUCTION
This article reviews recent developments and changes in legisla-
tion, case law, and Virginia Supreme Court Rules affecting civil lit-
igation. Its scope does not extend to criminal procedure or to top-
ics unique to equity practice.
II. RECENT VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
A. Negligence - Prima Facie Case
In two cases this year, the Virginia Supreme Court analyzed the
effect of the standard and burden of proof required to establish a
prima facie case of negligence.1 Although both cases involved mo-
tor vehicles that skidded or slipped on the roadway, the opinions
are broad enough to encompass other assertions of negligence, and
the proposition that a prima facie case showing of negligence is not
irrebuttable.
Medlar v. Mohan2 involved a personal injury automobile acci-
dent where one automobile collided with another after skidding
through a slippery intersection against a red light.' The defendant
driver asserted that her conduct was reasonable under the circum-
stances, and that the plaintiff had failed to keep a sufficient look-
out and was therefore contributorily negligent.4 The plaintiff con-
tended that the defendant's action constituted negligence "as a
matter of law," but the trial court allowed the issues to go to the
* Member, Heilig, McKenry, Fraim and Lollar, Norfolk, Va.; B.A., 1971, Virginia Military
Institute; J.D., 1976, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond.
** Associate, Heilig, McKenry, Fraim and Lollar, Norfolk, Va.; A.B., 1976, Dartmouth
College; J.D., 1979, Syracuse University College of Law; LL.M., 1987, The Judge Advocate
General's School, U.S. Army; M.L.T., 1987, Georgetown University College of Law.
1. Medlar v. Mohan, 242 Va. 162, 409 S.E.2d 123 (1991); Edlow v. Arnold, 243 Va. 345,
415 S.E.2d 436 (1992).
2. 242 Va. 162, 409 S.E.2d 123 (1991).
3. Id. at 164, 409 S.E.2d at 124.
4. Id. at 166-67, 409 S.E.2d at 125-26.
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jury and the jury found for the defendant.5 The supreme court,
affirming the decision of the trial court, held that "[mreere proof
that a motor vehicle skidded on a slippery highway does not estab-
lish the operator's negligence per se, but skidding is a circumstance
to be considered along with all the other evidence in determining
whether negligence has been proved."6 The focus of inquiry should
be on the conduct of the operator prior to the skidding.7 In Edlow
v. Arnold,8 another personal injury automobile accident case, the
supreme court again held that proof of skidding of a motor vehicle
on a slippery roadway did not establish the operator's per se negli-
gence.' The defendant in Edlow skidded into the rear of the plain-
tiff's vehicle while it was stopped, but as in Medlar, the supreme
court found the skidding or sliding only one circumstance to be
considered in determining whether negligence was shown.10
The plaintiff, relying on the rule set forth in Weems v. Blalock,"
argued that "her evidence that Arnold's car struck the rear end of
[the plaintiff's] car while it was lawfully stopped . . . 'established a
prima facie case of negligence.' ,12 The court reaffirmed this rule
but stated that "proof of facts raising a prima facie case of negli-
gence may be rebutted by other evidence."' 3 Although a rear-end
vehicle impact, as in this case, might be sufficient to establish a
prima facie showing of negligence, and might be sufficient to sup-
port a recovery, it was only sufficient "in the absence of evidence
that raises jury questions on the issues" of negligence and proxi-
mate cause. 4
B. Dispositive Motions - Standard
One of the issues most addressed by the supreme court over the
course of the last year involved the standard for dispositive mo-
5. Id. at 164-65, 409 S.E.2d at 124-25.
6. Id. at 165, 409 S.E.2d at 125 (citing Pullen v. Fagan, 204 Va. 601, 604, 132 S.E.2d 718,
721 (1963); Whitley v. Patterson, 204 Va. 36, 38, 129 S.E.2d 19, 21 (1963); Crist v. Coach
Co., 196 Va. 642, 650, 85 S.E.2d 213, 217 (1955)).
7. Id.
8. 243 Va. 345, 415 S.E.2d 436 (1992).
9. Id. at 351, 415 S.E.2d at 439.
10. Id. at 348-51, 415 S.E.2d at 437-39.
11. 226 Va. 304, 305-306, 309 S.E.2d 302, 303 (1983).
12. 243 Va. at 349, 415 S.E.2d at 438.
13. Id. at 350, 415 S.E.2d at 439.
14. Id.
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tions, including motions to strike and motions for summary
judgment.
In Izadpanah v. Boeing Joint Venture,'5 the trial court, after
hearing and weighing the evidence, granted the defendants' motion
to strike. The supreme court reversed, finding that the trial court's
weighing of the evidence prior to its decision impermissibly
usurped the jury's role.1 The court reiterated the analysis stan-
dard applicable to a motion to strike: "the trial court must view
the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from the evi-
dence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. '17
Again, in Rogers v. Marrow,' the supreme court found that the
trial court had improperly substituted its judgment for that of the
jury. Rogers was a medical malpractice case wherein two expert
witnesses testified that the defendant violated the appropriate
standard of care in treating his patient, and a third expert testified
that the doctor's treatment of the patient "met the required stan-
dard of care."' 9 The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defend-
ant, but the trial court set aside the verdict, holding that pursuant
to section 8.01-430 of the Code of Virginia "there was sufficient
evidence for it to determine the case on the merits. '20 Finding that
the evidence was" 'virtually not rebutted,'" the trial judge entered
judgment for the plaintiff.21
The supreme court reinstated the verdict for the defendant,
finding that the trial court could not substitute its result for that
of the jury merely because the court found the defendant's evi-
~ '~ * 22dence "inconclusive" or "ambiguous. The burden of proof in a
negligence case is always on the plaintiff and never shifts to the
defendant.23 "'If there is a conflict in the testimony on a material
point, or if reasonable men may differ in their conclusions of fact
to be drawn from the evidence, or if the conclusion is dependent
15. 243 Va. 81, 412 S.E.2d 708 (1992).
16. Id. at 83, 412 S.E.2d at 709 (citing Higgins v. Bowdoin, 238 Va. 134, 141, 380 S.E.2d
904, 908 (1989); Williams v. Vaughan, 214 Va. 307, 310, 199 S.E.2d 515, 517-18 (1973)).
17. Id. at 82, 412 S.E.2d at 709.
18. 243 Va. 162, 413 S.E.2d 344 (1992).
19. Id. at 165, 413 S.E.2d at 345.
20. Id. at 165-66, 413 S.E.2d at 345.
21. Id. at 166, 413 S.E.2d at 345-46.
22. Id. at 166-67, 413 S.E.2d at 346.
23. Id. at 167, 413 S.E.2d at 346 (citing Myers v. Sutton, 213 Va. 59, 61, 189 S.E.2d 336,
338 (1972)).
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on the weight to be given the testimony,'" the jury's verdict must
stand.24
A similar situation occurred in Holland v. Shively,25 where the
trial court set aside the jury verdict "in favor of a tenant who was
injured as a result of her landlord's alleged negligent repair of the
premises."2 The supreme court, in reversing, held that the issues
raised at the trial were those of fact. On the issue of negligence,
there was "sufficient evidence upon which the jury could have re-
lied to find that [the defendant] was negligent. ' 28 Further, as the
court noted, "assumption of the risk and contributory negligence
are normally jury issues unless reasonable minds could not differ
about their resolution. 2 9 Since reasonable minds could have dif-
fered as to the reasonableness of the plaintiff's conduct, the trial
court erred in holding that she was contributorily negligent as a
matter of law, and any assumption of the risk analysis was a jury
issue as well.30
C. Permissible Scope of Expert Opinions
In Todd v. Williams, 1 the supreme court had the opportunity to
interpret section 8.01-401.1 of the Code, which generally authorizes
the admission into evidence of an expert's opinion even if that
opinion is based on inadmissible hearsay.3 2 In Todd, a medical
malpractice case, one of the medical experts testified that he had
conducted a survey of the medical literature in the field and stated
that "his reading of the literature support[ed] his own view."33 The
court found it permissible for the expert to disclose to the jury the
24. Id. at 166, 413 S.E.2d at 346 (quoting Lane v. Scott, 220 Va. 578, 581, 260 S.E.2d 238,
240 (1979)).
25. 243 Va. 308, 415 S.E.2d 222 (1992).
26. Id. at 309, 415 S.E.2d at 223.
27. Id. at 311-12, 415 S.E.2d at 224.
28. Id. at 311, 415 S.E.2d at 224.
29. Id. (citing Artrip v. E.E. Berry Equip. Co., 240 Va. 354, 358, 397 S.E.2d 821, 824
(1990)).
30. Id. at 312, 415 S.E.2d at 224-25.
31. 242 Va. 178, 409 S.E.2d 450 (1991).
32. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-401.1 (Repl. Vol. 1992) provides in pertinent part:
The facts, circumstances or data relied upon by such witness in forming an opinion or
drawing inferences, if of a type normally relied upon by others in the particular field
of expertise in forming opinions and drawing inferences, need not be admissible in
evidence.
Id.
33. 242 Va. at 182-83, 409 S.E.2d at 452-53.
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sources he utilized in developing his opinion. The court concluded,
however, that it is not permissible for the expert to go "beyond
disclosing the identity of his sources and tell[] the jury the opin-
ions actually expressed in those sources."'34 To allow this type of
"'hearsay expert opinion without the testing safeguard of cross-
examination' would subject the opposing party to 'overwhelming
unfairness.' "5
In Llamera v. Commonwealth,36 the court held that it was re-
versible error to allow an expert opinion on the ultimate issue of
fact. 3 Further, the court noted that the qualification by the wit-
ness that the facts "would suggest" a particular result was not suf-
ficient to make the opinion proper, as the witness still had ex-
pressed an opinion on the ultimate issue of fact.3 8 An expert can
give an "opinion relative to the existence or non-existence of facts
not within common knowledge, [but] cannot give his opinion upon
the precise or ultimate fact in issue. ' 39
In Greater Richmond Transit Co. v. Wilkerson40 the court took
the opportunity to reiterate its holding in Bulala v. Boyd41 con-
cerning the necessary foundation for an expert's opinion. In this
case, the expert opinion related to loss of earning capacity, and the
court stated that "'such evidence must be grounded upon facts
specific to the individual whose loss is being calculated.' ,,42 Be-
cause in Greater Richmond Transit the expert had not been pro-
vided with all of the relevant data prior to his testimony, the su-
preme court found that his projections and opinions lacked
sufficient foundation, and should not have been admitted in
evidence.43
34. Id. at 183, 409 S.E.2d at 453.
35. Id. at 181, 409 S.E.2d at 452 (quoting McMunn v. Tatum, 237 Va. 558, 566, 379
S.E.2d 908, 912 (1989)).
36. 243 Va. 262, 414 S.E.2d 597 (1992).
37. Id. at 264-65, 414 S.E.2d at 598-99.
38. Id. at 265, 414 S.E.2d at 599.
39. Id. at 264, 414 S.E.2d at 598 (quoting Webb v. Commonwealth, 204 Va. 24, 33, 129
S.E.2d 22, 29 (1963)).
40. 242 Va. 65, 406 S.E.2d 28 (1991).
41. 239 Va. 218, 233, 389 S.E.2d 670, 677 (1990).
42. 242 Va. at 72, 406 S.E.2d at 33 (quoting Bulala, 239 Va. at 233, 389 S.E.2d at 677).
43. Id.
1992]
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D. Legal Malpractice - Standard of Proof - Measure of
Damages
When the Virginia Supreme Court decided Goldstein v. Kaest-
ner,44 a case of first impression, it fashioned a standard for review-
ing an attorney's liability for damages in a case sounding in legal
malpractice. The court held that the standard was whether the cli-
ent could prove as "a matter of law" that the underlying case giv-
ing rise to the malpractice claim would have been decided in his
favor." In Goldstein, the allegation centered on the failure of the
defendant to timely perfect an appeal." The supreme court held
that even if a timely appeal had been entered, a reversal of the
cause and an entry of judgment in favor of the plaintiff would not
have resulted "as a matter of law."'47 Therefore, the court affirmed
the trial court's judgment for the defendant attorney.48
In Duvall, Blackburn, Hale & Downey v. Siddiqui,49 the court
stated that the measure of damages in a legal malpractice action is
"the difference between what [the plaintiff] bargained for. . . and
the value of what she actually received."50 The attorney is liable
only for actual injury to the client, 1 and the plaintiff must show
facts and circumstances from which a reasonably certain estimate
of those damages can be made.52
E. Products Liability
The supreme court used its decision in Owens-Corning Fiberglas
Corp. v. Watson"3 as a vehicle for addressing many of the current
concerns of products liability litigators. This case, dealing with a
manufacturer's duty to warn, the foundation for and extent of al-
lowable expert testimony, and the allowance of punitive damages,54
44. 243 Va. 169, 413 S.E.2d 347 (1992).
45. Id. at 172, 413 S.E.2d at 349.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 175, 413 S.E.2d at 350.
48. Id.
49. 243 Va. 494, 416 S.E.2d 448 (1992).
50. Id. at 498, 416 S.E.2d at 450; see Long & Foster Real Estate v. Clay, 231 Va. 170, 343
S.E.2d 297 (1986); Jennings v. Lake, 230 S.E,2d 903, 904 (S.C. 1976).
51. Siddiqui, 243 Va. at 497, 416 S.E.2d at 450 (citing Allied Productions v. Duesterdick,
217 Va. 763, 764-65, 232 S.E.2d 774, 775 (1977)).
52. Id. (citing Goldstein v. Kaestner, 243 Va. 169, 173, 413 S.E.2d 347, 349-50 (1992)).
53. 243 Va. 128, 413 S.E.2d 630 (1992).
54. Note that the Fourth Circuit's decision in Johnson v. Hugo's Skateway, 949 F.2d 1338
(4th Cir. 1991), found that to comport with the due process requirements of the Fifth
[Vol. 26:679
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has an impact beyond its obvious applicability to pending asbestos
litigation in Virginia.
The court let stand an award of punitive damages rendered
against Owens-Corning by utilizing the willful or wanton conduct
standard established in Infant C. v. Boy Scouts of America.5 The
court found that the award could have been justified by the jury,
concluding that Owens-Corning, like the owner of A-Line Indus-
tries in Philip Morris, Inc. v. Emerson,56 "committed certain posi-
tive acts which the jury could have concluded constituted willful or
wanton conduct evincing a conscious disregard of the rights of
others. 57
Also in Owens-Corning, the court defined the applicable stan-
dard for imposition of a duty of care in a case involving a manufac-
turing defect or the dangerous propensity of a product.ss The court
clearly stated that the appropriate standard in Virginia is whether
the manufacturer "has a reason to know," as opposed to whether a
manufacturer "should know" of a defect or dangerous propensity
in its product.5" In Owens-Corning, however, instructions were
given to the jury which imposed the "should know" standard on
the defendant. This standard implies that the actor owes another
the duty of ascertaining the fact in question. 0 Because the defend-
ant did not object, this standard became the law of the Owens-
Corning case."
In an area of tremendous importance to products liability litiga-
tion, the court allowed the introduction of workers' compensation
claims filed by other asbestos workers, finding that they were "sub-
stantially similar" to the facts and circumstances in Watson's
Amendment, the post-trial and appellate review of Virginia punitive damage awards in the
federal courts of the Fourth Circuit must utilize standards similar to those enunciated by
the Alabama courts in Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So.2d 218 (Ala. 1989), Central Ala.
Elec. Coop. v. Tapley, 546 So.2d 371 (Ala. 1989), as upheld in Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991), and Hammon v. City of Gadsden, 493 So.2d 1374 (Ala. 1986).
55. 239 Va. 572, 581-83, 391 S.E.2d 322, 327-28 (1990).
56. 235 Va. 380, 407, 368 S.E.2d 268, 283 (1988).
57. 243 Va. at 146, 413 S.E.2d at 640-41. In Tazewell Oil Co. v. United Virginia Bank, 243
Va. 94, 413 S.E.2d 611 (1992), the supreme court upheld an award of punitive damages
based on a count of conspiracy to injure the plaintiff's business in violation of Code §§ 18.2-
499(a) & -500.
58. 243 Va. at 135, 413 S.E.2d at 634-35.
59. Id. at 136, 413 S.E.2d at 634-35.
60. Id.; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 12 cmt. a (1965).
61. 243 Va. at 136, 413 S.E.2d at 635.
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claim. The Owens-Corning court reiterated, the standards set in
Spurlin v. Richardson62 and concluded that:
Evidence of other similar accidents or occurrences, when relevant, is
admissible to show that the defendant had notice and actual knowl-
edge of a defective condition; . . . [if the prior] occurrences, hap-
pened . . . under substantially the same circumstances, and had
been caused by the same or similar defects and dangers as those in
issue . . . the 'substantial similarity' test is satisfied because the
other insulators claimed that they acquired lung disease caused by
exposure to asbestos dust while using insulation products.63
Although not expressly adopting the view, the court in Harris v.
T.L, Inc. 4 assumed that in a proper case it would recognize a post-
sale duty to warn on behalf of a successor corporation in a prod-
ucts liability/breach of warranty case.6
Besser Co. v. Hansen6 involved a manufacturer's tort and im-
plied warranty liability arising out of a third party's alleged misuse
of a product.6 7 The court found that the plaintiff had the burden
of showing: "(1) that the goods were unreasonably dangerous either
for the use to which they would ordinarily be put or for some other
reasonably foreseeable purpose, and (2) that the unreasonably dan-
gerous condition existed when the goods left the defendant's
hands."6 8 Because the evidence showed that the product had been
used in an unforeseeable fashion,6 9 there could be "no recovery
against the manufacturer for breach of these implied warranties. '7 0
F. Breach of Contract - Tortious Breach of Duty
The court, further interpreting Kamlar Corp. v. Haley"' and
Wright v. Everett,7 2 held in Foreign Mission Board v. Wade7 s that
62, 203 Va. 984, 128 S.E.2d 273 (1962).
63. 243 Va. at 137, 413 S.E.2d at 635-36.
64. 243 Va. 63, 413 S.E.2d 605 (1992).
65. Id. at 72, 413 S.E.2d at 610.
66. 243 Va. 267, 415 S.E.2d 138 (1992).
67. Id. at 269, 415 S.E.2d at 139.
68. Id. at 277, 415 S.E.2d at 144 (citing Logan v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 216 Va. 425,
428, 219 S.E.2d 685, 687 (1975)).
69. Id. at 278, 415 S.E.2d at 144.
70. Id. at 277-78, 415 S.E.2d at 144 (citing Featherall v. Firestone, 219 Va. 949, 963-64,
252 S.E.2d 358, 367 (1979)).
71. 224 Va. 699, 299 S.E.2d 514 (1983).
72. 197 Va. 608, 90 S.E.2d 855 (1956).
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those cases do not stand for the proposition that the breach of a
contractual duty necessarily constitutes an independent tort suffi-
cient to form the basis of a negligence action. 4 In both Wright and
Kamlar the court recognized that in certain circumstances the ac-
tions of the party breaching the contract can show "both a breach
of the contract terms and a tortious breach of duty. ' 75 However,
"the duty tortiously or negligently breached must be a common
law duty, not one existing between the parties solely by virtue of
the contract. ' 7 The court eliminated any questions left by Wright
and Kamlar and found that to establish a tort action based solely
on the negligent breach of a contractual duty there must be a cor-
responding breach of a common law duty.
77
Following general agency law, in Miller v. Quarles78 the supreme
court found that both a principal and his agent "are jointly liable
to injured third parties for the agent's negligent performance of his
common law duty of reasonable care, '79 and that "an agent has a
tort liability for injuries to a third party resulting from the agent's
negligent act while acting within the scope of his employment by
the principal." 80 Because a "principal is liable to the other con-
tracting party who has been damaged by the agent's negligent per-
formance of the principal's contract," the negligent agent's act
should also impose the same liability upon him.81
G. Respondeat Superior
Sayles v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc.8 2 involved a plaintiff's claim
against a negligent employee and his employer under the doctrine
of respondeat superior. After a Christmas party hosted by Picca-
dilly Cafeterias for its employees, the plaintiff and the Piccadilly
employee left the party at approximately the same time, and were
73. 242 Va. 234, 409 S.E.2d 144 (1991).
74. Id. at 241, 409 S.E.2d at 148.
75. 224 Va. at 705, 299 S.E.2d at 517.
76. 242 Va. at 241, 409 S.E.2d at 148; Spence v. Norfolk & W.R. Co., 92 Va. 102, 22 S.E.
815 (1895).
77. 242 Va. at 241, 409 S.E.2d at 148.
78. 242 Va. 343, 410 S.E.2d 639 (1991).
79. Id. at 347, 410 S.E.2d at 642.
80. Id. at 347, 410 S.E.2d at 641; see McLaughlin v. Siegel, 166 Va. 374, 185 S.E.2d 873
(1936); see also Thurston Metals & Supply Co. v. Taylor, 230 Va. 475, 483-484, 339 S.E.2d
538, 543 (1986).
81. 242 Va. at 348, 410 S.E.2d at 642.
82. 242 Va. 328, 410 S.E.2d 632 (1991).
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subsequently involved in an automobile accident."3 The plaintiff
contended that the employee was acting "within the scope of his
employment" while attending the party, and was therefore acting
as the servant of Piccadilly Cafeterias. 4 The supreme court made a
clear distinction between whether an accidental injury "'[arose]
out of and in the course of employment,' within the meaning of
Code § 65.1-7 [now 65.2-101],' '85 and whether a servant acted
within the scope of his employment under the doctrine of respon-
deat superior."6 It is the master-servant relationship that must be
analyzed in arriving at a respondeat superior determination.8 7 Fur-
ther, it is necessary to establish that the master-servant relation-
ship claimed "existed at the time of the injuries"88 and "in respect
to the very transaction out of which the injury arose."89
H. Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation
Act
The Virginia Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act9
against the claim of twenty-nine non-participating physicians in
King v. Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation
Program.91
I. Charitable Immunity
The doctrine of limited immunity applicable to charities in Vir-
ginia was restricted to the direct beneficiaries of the charitable ac-
tivities by Straley v. Urbanna Chamber of Commerce.2 In Stra-
ley, the plaintiff, a spectator at a parade, was struck in the eye by
a piece of candy thrown by a parade participant.9 3 The court found
that, because she was not a resident of the town and received no
particular pecuniary benefit from the funds generated by the festi-
83. Id. at 329-30, 410 S.E.2d at 632-33.
84. Id. at 330, 410 S.E.2d at 633.
85. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-101 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
86. Sayles, 242 Va. at 331, 410 S.E.2d at 634.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 332, 410 S.E.2d at 634.
89. Id. (quoting Wyllie v. Palmer, 33 N.E. 381, 383 (N.Y. 1893), quoted in Blair v. Broad-
water, 121 Va. 301, 308, 93 S.E. 632, 634 (1917)).
90. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-5000 to -5021 (Repl. Vol. 1990 & Cum. Supp. 1992).
91. 242 Va. 404, 410 S.E.2d 656 (1991).
92. 243 Va. 32, 413 S.E.2d 47 (1992).
93. Id. at 33, 413 S.E.2d at 48.
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val,94 she was not a beneficiary of the charity's purposes which, in
this case, were to advance the commercial and civic interests of the
town and surrounding area. 5 On these facts, the court found that
the plaintiff was an "invitee to whom the defendants owed the
duty of reasonable care," ' and reversed the trial court's dismissal
of her claim on the grounds of charitable immunity.
97
J. Finality of Decisions
Practitioners have come to rely on the communication estab-
lished with the courts and their clerks, sometimes to their great
detriment. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case-in-chief during
a jury trial of the underlying action in Smith v. Stanaway,98 the
trial court sustained the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiff's
evidence. 9 On September 18, 1990, the final day of trial, a draft
order was prepared by the clerk of court, and the trial judge en-
tered the order without notice to counsel of record, and without
their endorsement. 100 On October 24, the trial judge granted the
defendant's previously filed motion for sanctions. The plaintiff
filed a notice of appeal on October 23, 1990, and a petition for ap-
peal on January 23, 1991.101
The supreme court found that the September 18, 1990 order was
valid and properly entered by the trial court,"0 2 and that the Octo-
ber 23, 1990 notice of appeal had therefore not been timely filed
pursuant to Rule 5:9(a). 03 The court therefore dismissed the ap-
peal. Further, since the September 18, 1990 order was final pursu-
94. Id. at 37, 413 S.E.2d at 50-51.
95. Id. at 37-38, 413 S.E.2d at 50-51.
96. Id. (citations omitted).
97. Id. at 38, 413 S.E.2d at 51.
98. 242 Va. 286, 410 S.E.2d 610 (1991).
99. Id. at 287, 410 S.E.2d at 611.
100. Id. at 287-88, 410 S.E.2d at 611.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 288-89, 410 S.E.2d at 612. The supreme court found that the final sentence of
VA. Sup. CT. R. 1:13 authorized the trial court "in its discretion" to dispense with require-
ments for notice or endorsement of counsel. Id.
103. VA. Sup. CT. R. 5:9 (requiring notice of appeal to be filed within 30 days after entry of
final judgment).
1992]
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ant to Rule 1:1,04 the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter
its October 24, 1990 order of sanctions."°5
K. Peremptory Challenges
In Faison v. Hudson (Henrico),'06 the Virginia Supreme Court
adopted the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Edmonson v. Lees-
ville Concrete Co.,' 07 extending to civil cases the Batson'0 s rule
prohibiting racially-motivated peremptory strikes. In Faison (Hen-
rico) a white plaintiff brought a wrongful death action against a
black defendant, and utilized a peremptory strike to remove the
only black member of the venire.1°9 The plaintiff stated at trial
that the juror was removed because of her age, demeanor, and oc-
cupation, reasons counsel asserted were racially neutral." 0 The su-
preme court reversed and found that the defendant had met his
prima facie standard of jury discrimination by a showing that the
plaintiff had removed from the venire the only member of the de-
fendant's race,"' and that the plaintiff had not overcome that
burden.112
L. Venue - Finality of Decisions - Res Judicata
In Faison v. Hudson (Richmond),"' venue was improper in the
original forum, and the defendant promptly filed a motion to
104. In pertinent part, VA. SUP. CT. R. 1:1 provides that:
All final judgments, orders, and decrees, irrespective of terms of court, shall remain
under the control of the trial court and subject to be modified, vacated or suspended
for twenty-one days after the date of entry, and no longer.
Id.
105. 242 Va. at 289, 410 S.E.2d at 612.
106. 243 Va. 397, 417 S.E.2d 305 (1992). On April 17, 1992, the supreme court settled two
different appeals arising out of the Faison case. As the case currently cited was from the
Circuit Court of Henrico County it is referred to in that fashion for clarity.
107. 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
108. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
109. Faison (Henrico), 243 Va. at 399-400, 417 S.E.2d at 307.
110. Id. at 400, 417 S.E.2d at 307. Justice Compton, joined in dissent by Chief Justice
Carrico, believed that the plaintiff's stated reasons for striking the black juror were racially
neutral, and that age, demeanor, and occupation were proper considerations when utilizing
peremptory strikes. Id. at 408, 417 S.E.2d at 311 (Compton, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 402, 417 S.E.2d at 308.
112. Id. at 402-03, 417 S.E.2d at 308.
113. 243 Va. 413, 417 S.E.2d 302 (1992). On April 17, 1992, the supreme court settled two
different appeals arising out of the Faison case. As the case currently cited was from the
Circuit Court of the City of Richmond it is referred to in that fashion for clarity.
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transfer venue. 114 After a period of six months, and approximately
one month prior to trial, the defendant brought the motion to
transfer to the attention of the trial court.115 Relying on section
8.01-264(A) of the Code,116 the trial court found that the moving
party had failed in her burden of going forward "promptly" with
the matter by not having the motion heard until six months after
its filing,117 and pursuant to the authority of section 8.01-265118
found good cause to retain the case for trial.1 9 The Virginia Su-
preme Court found that the trial court had properly exercised its
discretion in retaining the case.
In Faison (Richmond), the supreme court also addressed the fi-
nality of a judgment for res judicata purposes. Holding that "a
judgment is not final for the purposes of res judicata or collateral
estoppel when it is being appealed or when the time limits fixed
for perfecting the appeal have not expired,"' 20 the court reversed
the trial court's decision and remanded the case.
M. Nonsuits
In a case mentioned in this survey last year, the supreme court
upheld the trial court's decision in Homeowners Warehouse, Inc.
v. Rawlins. 2 " During the trial, the defendant moved to strike the
plaintiff's evidence in open court; the court then heard full argu-
ment on the motion and retired to consider its decision. The court
returned some time later to announce its decision to grant the mo-
tion to strike. 22 While the trial judge explained his rationale,
plaintiff's counsel interrupted and moved for a nonsuit. The trial
court granted the nonsuit, and the defendant appealed. 2 3 The su-
preme court, relying on Newton v. Veney & Raines 24 and Ber-
ryman v. Moody, 25 found that the motion to strike had not yet
114. Id. at 415, 417 S.E.2d at 302.
115. Id. at 415, 418, 417 S.E.2d at 302, 304.
116. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-264(A) (Repl. Vol. 1992).
117. Faison (Richmond), 243 Va. at 415, 417 S.E.2d at 302.
118. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-265 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
119. Faison (Richmond), 243 Va. at 418, 417 S.E.2d at 308.
120. Id. at 419, 417 S.E.2d at 308.
121. 242 Va. xiii, 409 S.E.2d 115 (1991) (by order).
122. Id. at xiv, 409 S.E.2d at 115 (Russell, J., dissenting).
123. Id.
124. 220 Va. 947, 265 S.E.2d 707 (1980).
125. 205 Va. 516, 137 S.E.2d 900 (1964).
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been "sustained" as provided in Code section 8.01-380(A) 26 and
that the plaintiff was entitled to the nonsuit. 17
III. CHANGES IN THE VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT RULES
There have been some important changes in the Rules of the
Virginia Supreme Court during the past year relating to general
civil practice and procedure in Virginia courts.
Rule 1:14 was entirely rewritten. Effective July 1, 1992, it now
provides: "A court may authorize the use of electronic or photo-
graphic means for the preservation of the record or parts
thereof."' 28
Rule 4:5(al) was amended effective September 1, 1991.21 Depo-
sitions may now also be taken in a county or city of the Common-
wealth in which "a nonparty witness resides, is employed, or has
his principal place of business." 30 This change makes the Rule
consistent with the statutory provisions of Code section 8.01-420.4
enacted during the 1991 legislative session. 13'
Rule 4:8(b) has been amended to delete the requirement to fur-
nish the court with copies of the interrogatory answers and oath.132
This brings Rule 4:8(b) into harmony with Rule 4:8(c).
A physical and mental examination pursuant to Rule 4:10"33 may
now be administered by a health care provider as defined in sec-
126. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-380(A) (Repl. Vol. 1992) provides in pertinent part:
A party shall not be allowed to suffer a nonsuit as to any cause of action ... unless
he does so before a motion to strike the evidence has been sustained or before the
jury retires from the bar or before the action has been submitted to the court for
decision.
Id.
127. 242 Va. at xiii, 409 S.E.2d at 115.
128. VA. SuP. CT. R. 1:14.
129. See VA. Sup. CT. R. 4:5 cmt.
130. VA. SuP. CT. R. 4:5(al).
131. Act of Mar. 5, 1991, ch. 81, 1991 Va. Acts 105 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-420.4
(Repl. Vol. 1992)). This statute allows depositions to be taken in the manner now provided
for in this rule. It had been presumed that in the case of conflict that the specific statutory
provision would control. The change to Rule 4:5 brings the statute and the rule into accord.
132. VA. SuP. CT. R. 4:8(b).
133. Id. 4:10.
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tion 8.01-581.1.134 Previously examinations must have been per-
formed by a physician. 3 5
Rule 5:17A was added effective July 1, 1991.136 This rule sets
forth the provisions for a petition for supreme court review, pursu-
ant to Code section 8.01-626,137 of a circuit court's granting or de-
nial of an injunction.'38
The amendments to Rules 5:24""9 and 5A:17,'140 effective July 1,
1991, expand the acceptable forms of security for appeals to in-
clude irrevocable letters of credit, and added a new Form 11 for
those instruments.14
1
References throughout the Rules to the "Industrial Commission"
have been amended to substitute the "Virginia Workers' Compen-
sation Commission,' 1 42 to become consistent with the terminology
of the Workers' Compensation Act.
141
IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN LEGISLATION
This section outlines some important statutory changes enacted
during the 1992 legislative session. It does not purport to be all-
inclusive, and only attempts to highlight legislation of general in-
terest to all civil practitioners. Unless otherwise provided, the pro-
visions discussed are effective July 1, 1992.
134. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.1 (Repl. Vol. 1992), in pertinent part, defines health care
provider as:
(i) a person, corporation, facility or institution licensed by this Commonwealth to
provide health care or professional services as a physician or hospital, dentist, phar-
macist, registered or licensed practical nurse, optometrist, podiatrist, chiropractor,
physical therapist, physical therapy assistant, clinical psychologist, health mainte-
nance organization,.
Id.
135. Former VA. SuP. CT. R. 4:10 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
136. VA. Sup. CT. R. 5:17A.
137. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-626 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
138. VA. SuP. CT. R. 5:17A.
139. Id. 5:24.
140. Id. 5A:17.
141. Id. part 5, form 11.
142. The following rules were amended effective Feb. 1, 1992: VA. Sup. CT. R. 5:5; 5A:1, :3,
:7, :9-:11, :16, :18, :29-31; part 5, form 7; part 5A, form 7; and part 6, § I, rule 1, UPC 1-1.
143. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 65.2-100 to -1310 (Repl. Vol. 1991 & Cum. Supp. 1992).
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A. Accrual for Causes of Action Involving Breast Implants
The amendment to Code section 8.01-249 adds to the limited list
of specific accrual times products liability cases "arising as a result
of implantation of any prosthetic device for breast augmentation
or reconstruction.' 1 44 The cause of action is deemed to accrue
when the fact of the injury and its causal connection to the im-
plantation is first communicated to the person by a physician.""
The statute by its terms applies to all actions filed on or after July
1, 1992.141 The new section does not apply to actions sounding
against health care providers as they are defined in Code § 8.01-
581.1.14 7 The supreme court has not yet decided whether the
amended statute applies retroactively.
B. Expert Standard in Medical Malpractice
A witness is now qualified to testify as an expert on the standard
of care in medical malpractice actions if he "demonstrates expert
knowledge of the standards of the defendant's specialty and of
what conduct conforms or fails to conform to those standards' ' 48
and has had an active clinical practice "in either the defendant's
specialty or a related field of medicine within one year of the date
of the alleged act or omission forming the basis of the action. 1 49
The former provision required that the testifying expert have an
active clinical practice in the same field or specialty as the defend-
ant.150 The addition of the "or a related field of medicine" lan-
guage greatly expands the discretion of the trial court to allow ex-
perts from related fields to provide evidence on breaches of the
standard of care. This change will both greatly expand the ease
with which counsel can obtain expert testimony and will enable
counsel to rely on experts in certain sub-specialties who may not
have qualified under the pre-1992 standard in their "general" field
of practice.
144. Act of Apr. 6, 1992, ch. 817, 1992 Va. Acts 1310 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
249(7) (Repl. Vol. 1992)).
145, Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.; see supra note 134.
148. Act of Mar. 10, 1992, ch. 240, 1992 Va. Acts 299 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
581.20(A) (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
149. Id.
150. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.20(A) (Cum. Supp. 1991).
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C. Additional Jurors
Code section 8.01-360 has been amended to abolish the practice
of using alternate jurors.151 The court may now direct the selection
of up to two additional jurors for cases it determines are likely to
be protracted.'52 For each two additional jurors to be chosen, the
plaintiff and defendant will each be granted one additional pe-
remptory challenge. 15 3 The identity of the additional jurors will be
determined by lot, and known only to the plaintiff and the defend-
ant at the time the jury is impaneled."" Any additional jurors not
needed to deliberate the case would be excused before final sub-
mission of the case to the jury to preserve the correct number of
jurors. 55
D. Evidence
Section 8.01-381 now provides that upon request by either party,
courts must instruct the jury that it may request exhibits for their
use during deliberations. 56 Exhibits requested by the jury will
then be sent to the jury room or otherwise made available for the
jury's use during deliberations. 5"
A new section, 8.01-417.1, has been added to allow any party,
upon timely motion, to read to the jury or to introduce into evi-
dence only selected portions of lengthy or multiple documents.
This right is tempered by the ability of the court to allow the en-
tire document to be received.158
Section 8.01-384 has been amended to clarify the non-waiver of
objections. 5" The amendment is declaratory of existing law 60 and
provides that:
151. Act of Mar. 30, 1992, ch. 536, 1992 Va. Acts 677 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
360 (Repl. Vol. 1992)).
152. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-360 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.; see also VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-359 (Repl. Vol. 1992) & 19.2-262 (Rep. Vol.
1990).
156. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-381 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
157. Id.
158. Act of Apr. 5, 1992, ch. 720, 1992 Va. Acts 1102 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
417.1 (Repl. Vol. 1992)).
159. Act of Mar. 30, 1992, ch. 564, 1992 Va. Acts 725 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
384(A) (Repl. Vol. 1992)).
160. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-384 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
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No party, after having made an objection or motion known to the
court, shall be required to make such objection or motion again in
order to preserve his right to appeal, challenge, or move for recon-
sideration of, a ruling, order, or action of the court. No party shall
be deemed to have agreed to, or acquiesced in, any written order of
a trial court so as to forfeit his right to contest such order on appeal
except by express written agreement in his endorsement of the or-
der. Arguments made at trial via written pleading, memorandum,
recital of objections in a final order, oral argument reduced to tran-
script, or agreed written statements of facts shall, unless expressly
withdrawn or waived, be deemed preserved therein for assertion on
appeal. 161
This change may resolve the uncertainty of counsel as to the
form of objections, or tenacity with which objections need to be
made to rulings, orders, or actions of the trial court.'62
Recorded telephone conversations are now admissible in civil ac-
tions pursuant to Code section 8.01-420.2 if the portion of the re-
cording to be admitted contains admissions which if true would
constitute criminal conduct which is the basis for the civil action,
provided one of the parties was aware the conversation was being
recorded.16' By its terms, the provision is not applicable to pro-
ceedings for divorce, separate maintenance, or annulment.64
Code section 8.01-391 has been amended to allow authenticated
copies of any court or court clerk's records to be submitted as evi-
dence in the same manner as the original, provided they are prop-
erly authenticated by the clerk or deputy clerk of that court. 65
E. Striking of Civil Cases
The Code allows a court to strike from its docket any pending
civil action in which there has been, after two years, no order or
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., Spitzli v. Minson, 231 Va. 12, 341 S.E.2d 170 (1986). In Spitzli, the trial
court found that the defendant's failure to object to jury instructions on the issues of con-
tributory negligence and proximate cause waived any contention that the trial court erred in
not ruling on those issues as a matter of law. Id. at 18, 341 S.E.2d at 173 (citing Hilton v.
Fayen, 196 Va. 860, 866, 86 S.E.2d 40, 43 (1955)).
163. Act of Mar. 30, 1992, ch. 567, 1992 Va. Acts 729 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
420.2 (Repl. Vol. 1992)).
164. Id.
165. Act of Mar. 20, 1992, ch. 393, 1992 Va. Acts 505 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
391(C) (Repl. Vol. 1992)).
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proceeding except to continue the action.' 6 However, the most re-
cent amendment to section 8.01-335 provides that no case may be
discontinued if either party requests that it be continued; following
such a request to continue by either party, the court must enter a
pretrial order pursuant to Rule 4:13167 controlling the subsequent
course of the case to ensure its timely resolution. 16 Thereafter, if
the court finds that the case has not been timely prosecuted pursu-
ant to its order, it may strike the case from the docket.16 9
In addition, the amendments allow any court in which a case has
been pending for more than three years without an order or pro-
ceeding other than to continue it, to strike the case from its docket
upon notice to all parties at their addresses as shown on the plead-
ings.170 Former law authorized a strike and dismissal only after five
years and did not require notice.17
Further, where a civil action is pending on appeal from a general
district court, and an appeal bond has been furnished by or on
behalf of any party against whom judgment has been rendered for
money or property, and there has been no order or proceeding for
more than one year except to continue the matter, the court may,
on notice, 17 2 dismiss the case and strike it from the docket. 7 3
F. Wrongful Death Beneficiaries
The legislature, in amending Code section 8.01-53, has changed
the classes and beneficiaries entitled to share a damage award for
wrongful death. In addition to parents, brothers, and sisters of the
decedent, the revised second class now includes a relative who was
"primarily dependent upon the decedent for support or services
and is also a member of the same household as the decedent.' ' 7 4
166. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-335(A) (Repl. Vol. 1992).
167. VA. Sup. CT. R. 4:13.
168. Act of Apr. 6, 1992, ch. 803, 1992 Va. Acts 1272 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
335(A) (Repl. Vol. 1992)).
169. Id.
170. Id. § 8.01-335(B).
171. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-335(B) (Repl. Vol. 1984 & Cum. Supp. 1991).
172. Notice is to the parties in interest, if known, or their counsel of record at his last
known address, at least fifteen days before the entry of such order. Act of Apr. 6, 1992, ch.
792, 1992 Va. Acts 1250 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-335(A), (C) (RepI. Vol. 1992)).
173. Id.
174. Act of Mar. 2, 1992, ch. 74, 1992 Va. Acts 75 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-53(A)
(Repl. Vol. 1992)).
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For purposes of section 8.01-53, "relative" is defined to include
"any person related to the decedent by blood, marriage, or adop-
tion and also includes a stepchild of the decedent."'15
G. Bad Check Transactions
Code sections 8.01-27.117e and 8.01-27.2177 have been amended to
strengthen the rights of both parties to private rights of action
arising out of bad check transactions. The 1992 amendments to
section 8.01-27.1 create liability for the "holder of a [bad] check,
draft or order" where charges to the "drawer" have been made in
excess of those allowed by section 8.01-27.1(A). 78 In this circum-
stance, the holder will be "liable to the drawer for the lesser of (i)
twenty dollars plus the excess of the authorized amount or (ii)
twice the amount charged in excess of the authorized amount. '179
Code section 8.01-27.2 has been amended to increase from $100
to $250 the civil recovery alternative for the giving of a bad check
not paid within thirty days of written notice. s0 The recovery
amount is the lesser of $250 or three times the amount of the
check,' 8 ' and is in addition to the amounts allowable under section8.01-27. 1.1182
H. Shoplifting and Employee Theft
A civil action for shoplifting or employee theft has been created
with the addition of Code section 8.01-44.4.183 From an adult or
emancipated minor who shoplifts, a merchant is now authorized to
collect a civil judgment for twice the actual cost of the merchan-
dise, with a minimum of $50, or for liquidated damages of no more
than $350 if the merchant retrieves the property in merchantable
175. Id.
176. Act of Mar. 10, 1992, ch. 238, 1992 Va. Acts 297 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
27.1 (Repl. Vol. 1992)).
177. Act of Mar. 27, 1992, ch. 501, 1992 Va. Acts 639 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
27.2 (Repl. Vol. 1992)).
178. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-27.1 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
179. Id. § 8.01-27.1(B).
180. Id. § 8.01-27.2.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Act of Apr. 5, 1992, ch. 721, 1992 Va. Acts 1102 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
44.4 (Repl. Vol. 1992)) (renumbered by the Virginia Code Commission from § 8.01-44.3 to §
8.01-44.4).
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condition.8 Further, the "prevailing party. . . shall be entitled to
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs not to exceed $150."'15 Action
under this section, however, may not be instituted if criminal ac-
tion has been initiated against the perpetrator under any shoplift-
ing statute.'88
I. Firemen - Duty of Care
Code section 8.01-226 now provides that law enforcement officers
and firefighters engaged in the performance of their duties are
owed a duty of ordinary care.18 7 Emergency medical personnel are
included in the definition of "firefighter.' s
J. Asbestos Consolidation
Section 8.01-374.1 allows the consolidation of forty or more as-
bestos cases that are pending against manufacturers and suppliers
if such cases involve common questions of law or fact.189
K. Tort Claims Against the Commonwealth
The amendments to Code section 8.01-195.4 now allow tort
claims against the Commonwealth not exceeding $10,000 l 91 to be
brought in general district court. In addition, the provisions of the
Virginia Tort Claims Act' 91 have been amended to allow service of
the notice of claim on the Director of the Division of Risk Manage-
ment as well as on the Attorney General. 9 2 In similar fashion, the
184. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-44.4(A) (Repl. Vol. 1992).
185. Id. § 8.01-44.4(C).
186. Id. (referring to §§ 18.2-95, -96, -102.1, -103, or any other criminal offense as defined
in § 8.01-44.4(F)).
187. Act of Apr. 5, 1992, ch. 731, 1992 Va. Acts 1110 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-226
(Repl. Vol. 1992)).
188. Id.
189. Act of Apr. 3, 1992, ch. 615, 1992 Va. Acts 893 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
374.1 (Repl. Vol. 1992)).
190. Act of Mar. 3, 1992, ch. 111, 1992 Va. Acts 124 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
195.4 (Repl. Vol. 1992)). The former limitation was $7,000. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.4
(Cum. Supp. 1991).
191. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-195.1 to -195.9 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
192. Act of Apr. 6, 1992, ch. 796, 1992 Va. Acts 1259 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-
195.4, -195.6 (Repl. Vol. 1992)).
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authority to adjust, compromise, or settle cases now also lies with
the Director of the Division of Risk Management.19
L. Confession of Judgment
Business practitioners should note that pursuant to the amend-
ments to section 8.01-433.1, confession of judgment provisions en-
tered into after January 1, 1993 must contain on their face the fol-
lowing statement in boldface print of not less that eight point type:
IMPORTANT NOTICE
THIS INSTRUMENT CONTAINS A CONFESSION OF JUDG-
MENT PROVISION WHICH CONSTITUTES A WAIVER OF
IMPORTANT RIGHTS YOU MAY HAVE AS A DEBTOR AND
ALLOWS THE CREDITOR TO OBTAIN A JUDGMENT
AGAINST YOU WITHOUT ANY FURTHER NOTICE. 9 4
Failure to comport with this requirement will prevent a party
from obtaining judgment based on a confession of judgment
provision. 9"
193. Act of Apr. 6, 1992, ch. 796, 1992 Va. Acts 1259 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
195.5 (Repl. Vol. 1992)).
194. Act of Mar. 20, 1992, ch. 392, 1992 Va. Acts 504 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
433.1 (Repl. Vol. 1992)).
195. Id.
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